The Enemy at the Gate

The Enemy at the Gate:
Habsburgs, Ottomans and
the Battle for Europe

This book about the siege of Vienna in 1683 and the battle for Europe is written by Andrew Wheatcroft, who is the author of several books, including The Ottomans (1993) and The Habsburgs (1996).

Given this background, Wheatcroft should be just the right person to cover the dramatic confrontation between these two empires in 1683, but it seems that he is not: there are some serious and surprising flaws here. As far as I can see, they have been ignored by most other reviewers, and therefore I feel I have to focus on them in this review.

PART ONE:

Regarding the illustrations

There are three maps in black-and-white. But maps should be in colour. Moreover, map and text should support each other, which is not always the case here. Several locations mentioned in the text are not shown on any map.

Nineteen illustrations are printed on glossy paper in two blocks. All black-and-white, even if the original is in colour. Placing all illustrations in one or two blocks is an old system, not very user-friendly. If you must do this, you should at least provide a cross-reference from the illustration to the relevant point in the text. But this is not done here.

There is (almost) no connection between text and illustrations. This fact is all the more remarkable, because the author claims to understand the importance of using visual material in the study of history.

On page xvi he thanks John Keegan, who “was the first person to encourage my interest … in the use of visual material in the study of history.”

The caption to illustration # 1 reads:

“In 1859 the Hungarian artist Sandor Wagner depicted the moment of self-sacrifice at the siege of Belgrade (1521) when Titusz Dugovics threw himself and the Ottoman commander from the walls of the citadel.”

In fact, this painting shows the siege of Belgrade in 1456 (not 1521). Who is Titusz Dugovics, and what was the reason for his self-sacrifice? According to the legend, he was a Hungarian soldier defending Belgrade. When an Ottoman soldier tried to place an Ottoman flag on the city wall, he stopped him by throwing himself and the enemy soldier from the wall. This is not explained in the book; and it gets worse: Titusz Dugovics seems to be a fictional person. Perhaps the whole story is a legend.

The Habsburg capture of Buda in 1686 is the subject of a small oil painting mentioned on pp. 223-224. But this contemporary source, dated 6 September 1686, is not shown in the book. Instead the author gives us illustration # 16, which was painted about 200 years after the event.

The caption to illustration # 16 begins like this:

“Bertalan Szekely (1835-1910) laboured for more than ten years working on his vast panorama of the storming of Buda in 1686.”  

In fact, this painting is the work of Gyula Benczur (1844-1920), who painted it from 1885 to 1896.

 

PART TWO:

Regarding the text 

On page 58 Wheatcroft contradicts himself: Suleiman’s conquest of Belgrade in 1521 was “only the first of Suleiman’s succession of victories.” But Suleiman did not always win, as the next paragraphs reveal. He failed to take:

* Vienna in 1529
* Koszeg in 1532
* Szigetvar in 1541 and 1556

This line of failures is hardly a “succession of victories.”

On page 136 the author makes a most surprising statement:

“Constantinople fell [in 1453] because its small garrison lost the will to resist.”

Why does an expert on Ottoman history make such a claim, when there is no evidence to support it, and a lot to refute it?

One page 4 he writes:

"The stories of Manzikert and of another Byzantine defeat almost a century later at Myriocephalon (1176) in western Anatolia were transmitted to the west via Hungary."

The battle of Manzikert took place in 1071. The distance between these two battles is not "almost a century," it is more than a century. Why does he say "almost a century later," when he should say "more than a century later"?

On page 7 he writes:

"Just over a year later, on 24 May 1453, the young Sultan Mehmet II took Constantinople by storm."   

The fall of Constantinople is an important date in world history. But the date provided by Wheatcroft (24 May 1453) is wrong. It was on 29 May 1453. How can an expert get such an important date wrong?

On page 244 he writes:

"When peace was finally signed at the town of Sistova, on the Danube, near Nicopolis, Belgrade was handed back to Sultan Selim II as part of the settlement."

The treaty was signed on 4 August in Sistova (in present-day Bulgaria) to end the Austro-Turkish war of 1787-1791. Who was the Ottoman sultan at that time? Selim II? No! Selim II ruled 1566-1574. The sultan, who ruled when the treaty was signed in Sistova, is Selim III, who ruled 1789-1807. This time the author could perhaps excuse himself by saying that it is only a misprint and not a mistake. Perhaps. But if so, it is a most unfortunate misprint. If you check the index, you will see that there is no confusion here. According to the index (page 337), Selim II is mentioned three times (pp. 36, 42, and 54), while Selim III is mentioned only once (page 244).

Wheatcroft provides extensive historical background before he gets to the siege of Vienna in 1683. But he is not consistent when doing this: the battle of Lepanto (1571) is mentioned three times (pp. 73, 166, 190), while the battle of Malta in 1565 is never mentioned at all, even though this battle was an important event in the conflict between east and west.

The third Ottoman siege of Szigetvar (1566) is described in great detail (pp. 59-61), and the final desperate moment of the battle is the subject of illustration # 2, but one important piece of information is not given here:

During the siege Habsburg Emperor Maximilian II was waiting with 80,000 troops not far to the north, but he refused to help the town under siege, calculating that a few thousand Hungarian lives were worth sacrificing, if they could delay the Ottoman forces for a while.

On page 104 we are told the Duke of Lorraine was appointed as field commander on 6 May 1683, “the role Montecuccoli had filled until his death almost two years before.”

But Montecuccoli died in 1680 (as Wheatcroft says on page 100), which was almost three years before.

The author has problems with the geography of Austria and Hungary:

On page 162 he places Kahlenberg Hill “to the west of the city.” But this hill is northwest of Vienna. On page 164 he says “an army of relief … had gathered to the west of Vienna.” But the army had gathered northwest of the city.

Three times he talks about the northern and southern bank of the river which flows between Buda and Pest (pp. 205, 211 & 216).

The Danube is a long river. In Vienna it runs from west to east, so we have a northern and southern bank. But later it turns to the right, and when it reaches the Hungarian capital, it runs from north to south, so Buda is on the western bank, while Pest is on the eastern bank of the river.

There is more confusion on page 211: in late 1684, when the Christian powers gave up their siege of Buda and pulled their forces back, “the whole army began the march westwards towards Esztergom.” But Esztergom is located northwest of Budapest.

There are many flaws here, but the most perplexing of them all has to be the “Coda” about Turkey and the European Union (pp. 266-268). This statement goes against everything he has told us in his book. In addition, it is completely misplaced, because it is not relevant for his topic.

Without the “Coda” I might have given the book four stars. Because it is there, I can only give it three stars.

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Andrew Wheatcroft,
The Enemy at the Gate:
Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe,

Bodley Head (2008), Pimlico (2009), 339 pages.

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